Family Law Newsletter – May 2026
newsletter
28/05/2026
Welcome
Family Law Newsletter – May 2026; Articles, news, legislation updates and case updates from Care Proceedings, Private Law and Financial Remedy matters.
Edited by Niamh Brennan and Sarah Hutchinson; news and Case Updates by 2026 Pupil Victoria Ludwig.
Contributors
In The News
Revised Family Court guidance aims to improve case allocation and judicial efficiency in children matters: www.familylaw.co.uk
AI used by Judge to assist parents with understanding judgment: www.lawgazette.co.uk
The Young People’s Participation Pathway enables participation of young people in care proceedings: www.nuffieldfjo.org.uk
Key guidance on post-adoption contact: localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk
Judge lifts anonymity in child abduction case involving father wrongly released from custody: todaysfamilylawyer.co.uk
Case Updates
Re C (Article 13(b): Summary Return to Lithuania) [2026] EWHC 1120(Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, FMAILY DIVISION BEFORE CATHERINE COWTON KC SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
background
This case concerned an application under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 for the summary return of a child, C, to Lithuania following his wrongful removal to England by the father. The central issue for the court was whether the father had established the defence under Article 13(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention, namely that C’s return would expose him to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation.
The parties were both Lithuanian nationals. The mother lived in Lithuania, whilst the father had relocated to England with C, aged six and a half years. Following the parties’ separation in 2022, C had lived primarily with the mother in Lithuania and spent time with the father pursuant to arrangements formalised by the Lithuanian court. The mother alleged that during and after the relationship the father had been abusive and coercively controlling towards her, including threatening to remove C from her care and making repeated reports to Lithuanian authorities. Evidence before the court included police records referring to incidents of alleged domestic abuse and voicemail messages sent by the father in early 2026, in which he made threats concerning the mother’s future contact with C and expressed confidence that English courts would override Lithuanian proceedings.
The father relied heavily on events occurring between March and June 2024 concerning the mother’s mental health and alcohol misuse. During this period the police attended several incidents involving concerns about intoxication and suicidal ideation. On 29 April 2024 the mother was admitted to psychiatric care following an incident in which she was found intoxicated and expressing suicidal thoughts. She subsequently underwent psychiatric treatment, addiction treatment, and inpatient rehabilitation over several weeks.
As a result of these concerns, C was placed in the father’s care in April 2024. In June 2024 the Lithuanian court approved a settlement agreement providing that C would continue living with the father in Lithuania, with the mother to have contact by agreement between the parties. The arrangement did not authorise the father to remove C from Lithuania. On or about 2 August 2024, the father travelled to England with C without the mother’s consent or permission from the Lithuanian court. Although the father had indicated to Lithuanian authorities that the move would be temporary, until November 2024, he did not return with C.
The mother subsequently commenced proceedings in Lithuania seeking defined contact and later initiated Hague Convention proceedings in England for C’s return.
The proceedings in England were significantly delayed by difficulties locating the father and C. Numerous disclosure orders were required involving government departments, telecommunications providers, schools, and landlords before the father’s whereabouts were identified. During this period C had no direct contact with the mother, though limited indirect video contact occurred.
The father accepted that the removal was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. He further accepted that the mother had rights of custody which she was exercising, that she had not consented to the removal, and that she had not acquiesced in C remaining in England. The sole issue before the court was therefore whether the father had established the Article 13(b) exception.
The court also had the benefit of a CAFCASS report. The CAFCASS officer observed that C presented as immature for his age and had difficulty fully understanding the proceedings. C expressed positive feelings towards both parents and stated that he wished to be with both of them. The report concluded that the Lithuanian court was best placed to determine long-term welfare arrangements.
Legal Framework
The court applied the principles governing the Article 13(b) exception under the 1980 Hague Convention. The burden of proof rests on the abducting parent seeking to resist return, and the applicable standard is the balance of probabilities. The court relied primarily on Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27 in which the Supreme Court confirmed that the Article 13(b) defence is one of restricted application requiring proof of a “grave” risk of physical or psychological harm or an otherwise intolerable situation.
The court reiterated that the risk must be substantial and serious, rather than merely real or speculative. The court further emphasised that Article 13(b) is future-focused, requiring consideration of the circumstances the child would face if returned, including the protective measures available in the requesting state. The court recognised that undertakings and local protective mechanisms may sufficiently reduce any identified risk. The principles summarised in Re IG (A Child) (Child Abduction: Habitual Residence: Article 13(b)) [2021] EWCA Civ 1123 were also applied, including the need to focus on the child’s position, to evaluate allegations holistically, and to consider whether identified risks could be adequately addressed through protective measures.
In relation to delay, the court considered Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51 which recognised that prolonged delay and resulting settlement may, in certain circumstances, contribute to an intolerable situation under Article 13(b). However, the court also relied on Re L-S (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 2177 which emphasised that the mere passage of time does not itself establish intolerability and must instead be viewed through the stringent requirements of Article 13(b).
The court further adopted the approach in Re B (Children) [2022] EWCA Civ 1171 which requires the cumulative impact of multiple alleged risk factors to be assessed holistically rather than in isolation. The court acknowledged the summary nature of Hague Convention proceedings and recognised the limitations on resolving disputed factual allegations within such proceedings, particularly where oral evidence and cross-examination are limited.
Judgment
Catherine Cowton KC concluded that the father had failed to establish the Article 13(b) defence and ordered C’s summary return to Lithuania. In relation to the mother’s mental health and alcohol misuse, the court accepted that the incidents occurring in spring 2024 were serious and had appropriately resulted in C temporarily living with the father in Lithuania whilst the mother received treatment. However, the court noted that the evidence demonstrated significant improvement in the mother’s circumstances since that period. Lithuanian Children’s Services had recorded positive changes in her life, and her older child continued living in her care. Importantly, there was no evidence of further incidents of intoxication during 2025.
The court emphasised that, upon return to Lithuania, C would initially remain living with the father pursuant to the existing Lithuanian court order.
Accordingly, any ongoing concerns regarding the mother’s circumstances could be addressed by Lithuanian courts and child protection authorities, which were already familiar with the family and far better placed to undertake welfare investigations. The court rejected the father’s argument that the mother’s historical difficulties created a grave risk of harm sufficient to engage Article 13(b). Whilst the incidents were concerning, they did not establish that C would presently face physical or psychological harm if returned to Lithuania. The court also rejected the father’s reliance on delay and alleged settlement in England. Although C had spent approximately twenty months in England, the court found that his circumstances there had been unstable and transitory. The father and C had moved repeatedly between temporary accommodation, C had initially received no formal education in England for over a year, and there remained uncertainty regarding their immigration status. The court further noted that C had been separated from his mother, who had been his primary carer for most of his life, for nearly two years. He had also been isolated from most members of his maternal and paternal family, all of whom remained in Lithuania.
The CAFCASS evidence indicated that C continued to express affection towards both parents and wished to maintain relationships with them. The court concluded that the evidence did not support the proposition that C had become fully settled in England or that returning him to Lithuania would place him in an intolerable situation. On the contrary, the court found that the prolonged separation from his mother and wider family may itself have caused emotional harm. The court placed significant weight on the fact that the Lithuanian courts were already actively seized of welfare proceedings concerning C and were best placed to determine long-term arrangements. Protective measures were also available, including the continuation of C living with the father initially upon return, gradual reintroduction of direct contact with the mother, and undertakings offered by the mother regarding non-harassment and non-interference.
Considering the evidence holistically, the court concluded that the father had failed to demonstrate a grave risk of harm or intolerability within the meaning of Article 13(b). The summary return order was therefore made. In conclusion, Catherine Cowton KC emphasised the narrow scope of the Article 13(b) exception and the importance of respecting the Hague Convention’s objective of promptly returning wrongfully removed children to their state of habitual residence. The judgment underscores that concerns regarding welfare, mental health, or settlement will not defeat a return application unless they reach the high threshold of grave risk and further highlights the importance of local courts determining substantive welfare disputes.
Full Judgment: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2026/1120.html
N’Djosse v Adeyeye [2026] EWHC 1033
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE HAYDEN
Factual Background
This case concerned urgent ex parte proceedings arising from the international abduction of a young child, Laurys, aged four, from France to Nigeria by his father. The proceedings focused upon the High Court’s exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to secure the return of a British child wrongfully removed from his country of habitual residence to a non-Hague Convention state, together with subsequent contempt proceedings arising from the father’s repeated failure to comply with return orders. Laurys was born in France in April 2021 and had lived there throughout his life with his mother, who resided in Grenoble. The parties’ relationship lasted approximately eight months, ending prior to Laurys’s birth. Following DNA testing in 2021 confirming the father’s paternity, the French court granted the father parental responsibility. In October 2023, the French court awarded the mother sole custody whilst providing for gradually increasing contact between Laurys and the father, initially supervised at a French contact centre. Contact commenced in January 2024. Records from the contact centre documented persistent difficulties concerning the father’s behaviour towards staff, including arrogance, hostility, and non-cooperation.
Nevertheless, the mother continued to facilitate contact in compliance with the French court orders. On 27 July 2024, Laurys stayed overnight with the father for the first time. He was due to be returned the following day, but the father failed to do so. Investigations quickly established that the address previously provided by the father to the French court was fictitious. Further enquiries revealed that the father had taken Laurys from France to England and subsequently onward to Nigeria.
It later emerged that the father had secretly obtained both British and Nigerian passports for Laurys without the mother’s knowledge or consent. French authorities issued an international arrest warrant, and the father was arrested in England in December 2024. Whilst in Nigeria, guardianship orders concerning Laurys were obtained from a Nigerian court in favour of individuals said to be relatives of the father. The English court was informed that those proceedings had been based upon false information, including assertions that the mother had consented to the arrangements.
The mother had neither notice of nor involvement in those proceedings.
Nigeria is not a signatory to the 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. Consequently, there was no treaty-based mechanism available to secure Laurys’s return to France. In December 2024 the mother applied to the High Court in England seeking location and return orders, initially believing Laurys might still be in England. By early 2025 it became clear that Laurys remained in Nigeria.
The proceedings therefore raised novel jurisdictional issues concerning whether the English High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction in circumstances where the child was physically present in neither England nor France. Expert evidence concerning French law was obtained, indicating that French legal proceedings alone were unlikely to secure Laurys’s prompt return from Nigeria. In May 2025 Mr Justice Hayden concluded that the English court possessed jurisdiction, derived from Laurys’s British nationality, to invoke its exceptional inherent powers to secure his return. Laurys was subsequently made a ward of court, and the court ordered his return directly to France, his country of habitual residence and the home of his primary carer.
The father persistently failed to comply with the return orders. In November 2025 Mrs Justice Judd found him in contempt of court for failing to take steps within Nigeria to facilitate Laurys’s return and for failing to provide affidavits undermining the Nigerian guardianship orders. In January 2026 he was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Despite this, he continued to refuse compliance.
Further return orders and contempt findings followed, culminating in a twelve-month sentence imposed in April 2026. However, due to administrative error at HMP Pentonville, the father was mistakenly released from custody the day after the sentence was imposed. The prison later acknowledged that the warrant had not been properly flagged before his release. At the time of the present hearing, the father remained unlawfully at large. The mother subsequently applied for the anonymity order protecting the parties’ identities to be lifted, arguing that publicity would assist in locating the father and securing his return to custody.
Legal Framework
The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under the parens patriae doctrine in relation to a child possessing British nationality. The case raised highly unusual jurisdictional issues because Laurys was physically present in neither England nor France, and Nigeria was not a contracting state to the Hague Convention. The court recognised that the inherent jurisdiction to secure the return of a child abroad is exceptional and had not previously been invoked in circumstances such as the present case. However, the court concluded that British nationality provided a sufficient jurisdictional basis for protective measures to be made in the child’s interests.
The proceedings also engaged principles relating to wardship, international child abduction, and the court’s coercive powers to enforce compliance with return orders through contempt proceedings. In considering whether to maintain anonymity, the court conducted a balancing exercise between the parties’ rights under Article 8 ECHR and the public interest in freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. The court recognised that anonymity orders are frequently necessary to protect vulnerable children but emphasised that such protections must be balanced against competing public interests. The court further recognised the importance of transparency where failures by state authorities contribute to the ongoing harm suffered by a child and family.
Judgment
Mr Justice Hayden reaffirmed the exceptional seriousness of the father’s conduct and the continuing necessity of securing Laurys’s return to France. The court described the abduction as a carefully planned and “brutal” removal of a young child from his primary carer. Mr Justice Hayden emphasised that Laurys had never previously spent a night away from his mother before being abducted and observed that the emotional consequences for both mother and child were profound.
The judgment described Laurys as having had his entire world “snatched away” by the very parent from whom he ought to have expected protection. The court was highly critical of the father’s conduct throughout the proceedings. Mr Justice Hayden concluded that the father had acted dishonestly on multiple occasions, including obtaining passports without consent, providing false information to foreign courts, and failing to comply with repeated court orders. The Nigerian guardianship orders were found to have been obtained on an apparently fraudulent basis through false assertions that the mother had consented. The court also emphasised the significance of the father’s continuing refusal to take steps capable of facilitating Laurys’s return, notwithstanding repeated findings of contempt and multiple custodial sentences. His conduct was regarded as a flagrant disregard for both the English court’s authority and Laurys’s welfare.
Mr Justice Hayden expressed particular concern regarding the mistaken release of the father from prison following the imposition of the twelve-month committal sentence. The court criticised the apparent lack of urgency and administrative failures surrounding the release, noting that the father’s detention represented perhaps the best opportunity for securing Laurys’s reunification with his mother. In relation to anonymity, the court concluded that the balance between Articles 8 and 10 ECHR now favoured disclosure. Mr Justice Hayden accepted that publicity might materially assist efforts to locate the father and return him to custody. The court therefore authorised publication of the names and images of both the father and Laurys, as well as the mother’s identity. The court further observed that there existed a strong public interest in transparent reporting where failures by state authorities had contributed to the ongoing injustice suffered by the family. Additional disclosure orders were made to facilitate efforts to trace the father’s whereabouts. The judgment was also directed to be sent immediately to the Governor of HMP Pentonville and forwarded to the Metropolitan Police.
In conclusion, Mr Justice Hayden emphasised the exceptional nature of the court’s inherent jurisdiction in international child abduction cases involving non-Hague Convention states. The judgment highlights both the breadth of the High Court’s protective powers in cases involving British children abroad and the serious consequences of persistent non-compliance with return orders. It further underscores the court’s willingness to prioritise transparency and publicity where necessary to protect children and secure the administration of justice.
Full Judgement: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2026/1033.html
Re X and Y (Fact-Finding: Alleged Abusive Head Trauma) [2026] EWFC 72
IN THE FAMILY COURT BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE JUDD
Factual Background
This case concerned a fact-finding hearing within care proceedings arising from the death of a young child, Z, aged two and a half, who sustained head injuries whilst in the sole care of the mother. The central issue for the court was whether those injuries were inflicted, as alleged by the local authority, or caused by an accidental fall, as consistently maintained by the mother.
The mother, who was in her early twenties, was caring for Z alongside her own two young children at her home. Her relationship history included a prior abusive relationship with the father of her own children, which had ended before the events in question, and a more recent relationship with Z’s father. Z stayed with his father regularly, including overnight visits, and had been in the mother’s care on a routine basis prior to the incident.
On the morning of 5 March 2025, Z’s father left for work at approximately 7am, leaving the mother as the sole carer for all three children. The mother’s account, which remained consistent from the 999 call through to her oral evidence, was that the children had been playing in the front room whilst she was preparing to leave for a playgroup. She briefly went into the adjacent kitchen to make a drink and, during that time, heard a sudden noise. On returning, she found that Z and one of the children had fallen from the sofa. Z appeared unresponsive and severely unwell. The mother immediately called emergency services.
The contemporaneous 999 call captured the mother describing Z’s condition in real time, including abnormal breathing and reduced responsiveness. Emergency services attended promptly, and Z was transferred to hospital. Medical investigations revealed a catastrophic brain injury, including subdural haemorrhage and profound hypoxic-ischaemic damage, together with extensive retinal haemorrhages. Despite surgical intervention, including a decompressive procedure, Z’s condition deteriorated and he was pronounced dead the following day.
Following the incident, emergency protection orders were obtained in respect of the mother’s children, who were initially placed with family members and later in foster care. The local authority advanced a detailed threshold case, alleging that Z’s injuries were inflicted by the mother through shaking and/or impact, and further asserting that her parenting practices gave rise to a continuing risk of significant harm.
The mother denied inflicting any injury and maintained throughout that the incident was accidental. She accepted certain lifestyle factors, including occasional cannabis use and briefly leaving her children unattended while asleep, but contended that these matters were neither causative of the incident nor sufficient to meet the statutory threshold.
The court had before it extensive evidence, including detailed medical expert reports from specialists in pathology, ophthalmology, neurosurgery, and paediatrics, together with a substantial body of contemporaneous evidence, including the 999-call recording and prolonged police body-worn camera footage capturing the mother’s behaviour and accounts shortly after the incident
Legal Framework
The court acted in accordance with established principles governing fact-finding hearings in care proceedings. The burden of proof lies on the local authority, and the applicable standard is the balance of probabilities, as reaffirmed in Re JS [2012] EWHC 1370 (Fam). Findings must be based on evidence and proper inferences, and not on suspicion or speculation.
The court emphasised that there is no obligation on a parent to establish an alternative explanation for injuries, and the failure to do so does not, of itself, prove the local authority’s case. This principle has been clearly articulated in Re X (Children) (No 3) [2015] EWHC 3651 (Fam) and Re Y (No 3) [2016] EWHC 503 (Fam) and reaffirmed in Wolverhampton City Council v JA and Ors [2017] EWFC 62.
The court further reiterated that medical and lay evidence must be evaluated holistically, with neither taking precedence over the other. This approach reflects appellate guidance, including Re R (Children: Findings of Fact) [2024] EWCA Civ 153, which emphasises that both forms of evidence are integral to the fact-finding exercise:
“33. The court was therefore called upon to evaluate a number of competing improbabilities. The first scenario involved C suffering injuries that were highly unlikely, individually and collectively, to have resulted from a banal domestic fall. The other two scenarios involved other kinds of improbability. In the second scenario, that of a child being shaken by an otherwise loving relative in the midst of a good-natured family gathering; in the last scenario, that of a sustained cover-up on the part of an entire family whose history contains none of the general risk factors that are associated with child mistreatment, while all of the protective factors are strongly present: cf. Re BR (Proof of Facts) [2015] EWFC 41 at para. 18. The court’s evaluation had to take account of the fact that unlikely events occur all the time, although the probability of them arising in any individual case is extremely low: ibid at para. 7.
34. I do not agree with the judge’s concept of speculation at paragraph 204. Of course he was right to say that the court’s task was to determine whether the local authority had proved its case on threshold on the balance of probability. However, that involved grappling with and drawing conclusions from all of the evidence, medical and lay. The medical appearances were clear and the explanation for them was highly likely; but it was not certain, as the judge acknowledged by his finding at paragraph 178i. Against that, the court had the accounts of six people who were with C at the time she was injured. It is wrong to describe the medical evidence as the canvas against which the other evidence was to be considered. Medical and non-medical evidence are both vital contributors in their own ways to these decisions and neither of them has precedence over the other.”
In assessing witness evidence, the court recognised the potential for discrepancies arising from stress, confusion, or the fallibility of memory, as discussed in Lancashire County Council v C, M and F (Children: Fact Finding Hearing) [2014] EWFC 3 and the well-known observations on memory in Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm).
The court also had regard to the need to consider the totality of the evidence before reaching conclusions, including the wider factual context, as emphasised by the Court of Appeal in A (A Child) (Fact-Finding: Head Injury) [2024] EWCA Civ 327.
Finally, the court recognised that in complex medical cases it may not always be possible to determine causation with certainty, and that medical knowledge evolves over time, as reflected in authorities such as R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1 and Re U (A Child) (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof): Re B (A Child) [2004] EWCA Civ 567. The court noting that ‘the words of Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P in Re U, Re B, still have a resonance today:’
“The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today’s medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research will throw light into corners that are at present dark.”
Judgment
Mrs Justice Judd concluded that the local authority had failed to discharge the burden of proving that Z’s injuries were inflicted.
The medical evidence established that Z had suffered a catastrophic brain injury accompanied by extensive retinal haemorrhages. The ophthalmological findings were regarded as highly suggestive of acceleration-deceleration forces and therefore consistent with abusive head trauma. However, the court noted that other aspects of the medical evidence introduced significant uncertainty. In particular, the neurosurgical evidence indicated that the brain injury could be explained by impact alone, including a fall onto the back of the head, and the clinical presentation did not align neatly with typical cases involving fatal shaking injuries.
The expert evidence, taken as a whole, was characterised by caution and acknowledgement of the case’s unusual features. The experts accepted that the case did not fit comfortably within established medical literature and described it as an “outlier” whether considered as accidental or non-accidental. Whilst the injuries were more commonly associated with abusive mechanisms, the possibility of an accidental cause, albeit rare, could not be excluded.
The court placed considerable weight on the contemporaneous evidence, which was described as particularly valuable. The 999 call and body-worn camera footage demonstrated that the mother had provided an immediate, detailed, and consistent account of an accidental fall. Her presentation was open, spontaneous, and unguarded, and she engaged readily with the attending officers. The court found no indication that she was attempting to conceal or fabricate events. Minor inconsistencies in her account were considered immaterial and consistent with the normal fallibility of memory in stressful circumstances.
The court also considered the broader context, including the absence of any history of violence towards children, the lack of prior safeguarding concerns of significance, and the practical difficulties associated with inflicting shaking-type injuries on a child of Z’s age and size. These factors further undermined the likelihood of an abusive mechanism.
In evaluating the totality of the evidence, the court concluded that, whilst the medical evidence raised serious concerns and pointed towards a possible abusive explanation, it was not determinative. The mother’s account was found to be credible, consistent, and supported by contemporaneous evidence. The local authority had therefore failed to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the injuries were inflicted.
Accordingly, the court found that it was more likely than not that Z’s injuries were caused by an accidental fall. The findings sought by the local authority were not made.
In relation to threshold under Children Act 1989, the court further concluded that the concerns regarding the mother’s cannabis use and her brief absences from the home, while not to be encouraged, were insufficient either individually or cumulatively to establish that the children were suffering or likely to suffer significant harm. The evidence indicated that the children were otherwise well cared for, and the statutory threshold was not satisfied.
In conclusion, Mrs Justice Judd emphasised the importance of a holistic and balanced evaluation of all the evidence in complex fact-finding cases. The judgment underscores that even strong medical indicators of abuse cannot displace a credible and consistent alternative account unless the local authority satisfies the burden of proof. It further highlights the limits of medical certainty and the critical role of contemporaneous and lay evidence in determining disputed issues of fact.
Full Judgment: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2026/72.html
