Family Law Newsletter – January 2026
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16/01/2026
Welcome
Family Law Newsletter – January 2026; Articles, news, legislation updates and case updates from Care Proceedings, Private Law and Financial Remedy matters.
Edited by Niamh Brennan and Sarah Hutchinson; news and Case Updates by 2026 Pupil Victoria Ludwig
Contributors
In The News
Case Updates
Liverpool City Council v VT & Ors (End of Life Care) [2025] EWHC 3215 (Fam) (5 December 2025)
In the Family Court before Mr Justice Peel
background
This case concerned N, an eight-year-old child with complex life-limiting disabilities. The court was required to determine whether it was in his best interests for life-sustaining ventilation to be withdrawn. The application was brought under the court’s inherent jurisdiction and arose in circumstances of unanimous medical agreement that N was at the end of his natural life.
N was of Romanian heritage with both of his parents being Romanian nationals living in Romania. N was born with complex medical needs and had been the subject of care orders since birth. His parents did not feel able to care for him, and following the making of a full care order in February 2018, N was placed with long-term foster carers. He had five siblings, all of whom were also placed in foster care, though not with N. N’s last direct contact with his mother occurred when he was two years old.
At nine weeks old, N presented with stridor, accompanied by abnormal muscle tone and irritability. Despite surgical intervention to address airway obstruction, his breathing difficulties persisted, leading to the insertion of a tracheostomy. Over the following years, N experienced repeated hospital admissions and was ultimately discharged into the community in December 2019 on long-term ventilation, supported by a comprehensive care package.
Notwithstanding his significant disabilities, N attended school, was able to go out into the community, and enjoyed sensory and social experiences. Mr Justice Peel paid particular tribute to the exceptional devotion and compassion shown by N’s foster carers and long-term carers, noting that they enabled him to enjoy life to the fullest extent possible within its limitations.
Over time, however, N’s condition deteriorated. A best interests meeting in July 2025 concluded that he should receive community-based palliative care, that CPR should not be attempted, and that there should be no further hospital admissions. In August 2025, the local authority applied to invoke the court’s inherent jurisdiction to authorise best interests decisions in respect of end-of-life care in the absence of parental consent. At that stage, clinicians did not consider it to be in N’s best interests for long-term ventilation to be withdrawn.
Extensive medical evidence was placed before the court, including reports from specialists in paediatric palliative care, neurology and respiratory medicine. Genetic testing confirmed that N suffered from a rare and severe autosomal recessive disorder associated with progressive neurological decline, severe developmental delay, epilepsy and respiratory insufficiency. The prognosis was uniformly described as poor, with no available curative treatment and respiratory failure being a common cause of death.
By autumn 2025, N’s condition worsened significantly. He became increasingly unresponsive, experienced escalating seizures, required rising doses of analgesia, and showed signs of autonomic instability. His ability to tolerate basic care diminished, and he could no longer engage with his environment in any meaningful way. Clinicians unanimously concluded that ventilation was now serving only to prolong dying and suffering rather than providing any therapeutic benefit.
Following a best interests meeting on 12 November 2025, the consensus view of all professionals involved was that continued ventilation was no longer in N’s best interests and that its withdrawal would allow a natural death. The hospital trust applied to restore proceedings and sought declarations authorising withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
N’s mother attended the proceedings. She did not dispute the medical evidence and accepted that N was dying. Her sole request was to be able to see him in person one final time before ventilation was withdrawn.
Legal Framework
The court emphasised that the legal principles governing withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment are clear and well established. The task for the court was to conduct a best interests analysis, focusing on whether it was in N’s interests to continue treatment, rather than whether it was justified to withdraw it.
Mr Justice Peel relied on the authoritative guidance of the Supreme Court in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67 in which Baroness Hale stressed that decision-makers must consider the patient’s welfare in the widest sense, including medical, emotional and psychological factors, and must attempt to view matters from the patient’s perspective. Treatment which confers no benefit, and instead causes suffering, cannot be in a patient’s best interests and cannot lawfully be continued.
The court also referred to Re A (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 759, which confirms that these principles apply with equal force in cases involving children. Although the Mental Capacity Act 2005 does not apply directly to children, the welfare analysis developed in adult cases provides essential guidance in paediatric end-of-life decisions.
In relation to the mother’s request for contact, the court treated this as a deemed application under section 34(3) of the Children Act 1989. The legal test remained the same: whether the proposed contact was in N’s best interests at this particular stage of his life.
Judgment
At the outset of the hearing, all parties agreed that the declarations sought by the Trust should be granted. The court accepted the unanimous medical evidence that N had reached the end of his natural life, and that continued ventilation was causing significant suffering without any corresponding benefit. Mr Justice Peel described the evidence as overwhelming and clear.
The court found that N was almost entirely reliant on ventilation, was largely unresponsive, experienced no pleasure or engagement with his surroundings, and was suffering repeated episodes of pain and distress despite optimal symptom management. The very treatments keeping him alive, including suctioning and tracheostomy care, were themselves sources of suffering. There was no curative treatment available, and no prospect of improvement. In those circumstances, it was not in N’s best interests for his life, and the attendant suffering, to be prolonged by artificial means.
The court therefore granted the declarations authorising withdrawal of long-term ventilation and associated life-sustaining treatments.
The more difficult issue concerned N’s mother’s wish to see him in person before life support was withdrawn. Mr Justice Peel acknowledged the depth of her distress and the tragedy of the situation. However, he concluded that a face-to-face visit was not in N’s best interests and refused the application.
In reaching that decision, the court considered that N had not seen his mother since early childhood and would not recognise her. A previous video call had caused distress and provided no discernible benefit to N. Any delay in withdrawing ventilation in order to facilitate an in-person visit would unnecessarily prolong N’s suffering. The court also took into account the impact such a visit would have on the foster carers, who wished to preserve the confidentiality of the placement and to focus on providing N with comfort and peace in his final moments.
The court permitted one final monitored video call between N and his mother, which subsequently took place. It was also directed that following N’s death, he would be moved to a bereavement suite where family members could attend to say their goodbyes.
In closing, Mr Justice Peel described the case as deeply sad and paid tribute to the courage of N, the love and dedication of his foster carers, and the compassion shown by the clinical teams. While expressing sympathy for N’s mother, the court reiterated that its paramount concern must remain the welfare of the child. Allowing N’s final moments to take place in as calm, stable and pain-free a manner as possible was the course most consistent with his best interests.
Full Judgment: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2025/3215.html
R v R [2025] EWHC Fam 3180 In the High Court of Justice
In the Family Division Before McKendrick J
Background
This case concerned an appeal brought by the mother against extensive findings of fact made by a District Judge following a contested fact-finding hearing in private law proceedings before the Family Court. The proceedings arose from a child arrangements order application issued by the father in August 2024 in respect of the parties’ three children, one born in 2013 and twins born in 2014.
The parents married in 2010 following a relationship that began in 2009. Throughout the marriage, there was significant involvement from the maternal extended family, including periods where several maternal relatives lived in the family home. The relationship deteriorated in 2020.
In April 2024, the mother made allegations of domestic abuse, including physical, emotional, coercive and financial abuse. The father left the family home shortly thereafter. Although some contact between the father and the children continued until June 2024, all contact then ceased. The father had not seen the children for approximately fourteen months by the time of the appeal hearing, despite attempts at facilitated contact through professionals.
The mother alleged that the father had been abusive towards her and the children. The father denied all allegations and asserted that the mother had engaged in alienating behaviours designed to undermine his relationship with the children. Given the seriousness of the allegations, a fact-finding hearing was ordered. The mother was designated a vulnerable witness pursuant to FPR Part 3A, and participation directions were made, including special measures within the court building and the use of a screen.
Following the fact- finding hearing, the District Judge made extensive findings against the mother, including that she had fabricated allegations of abuse, interfered with contact, colluded with the maternal grandmother, and caused emotional harm to the children. The court found that the father had not abused the mother or the children in any way.
The mother sought permission to appeal all findings. Permission was granted on one ground only, relating to the treatment of her as a vulnerable witness, and refused on all remaining grounds.
The Mother’s Case
The mother’s appeal focused primarily on procedural fairness. She contended that there had been a failure to ensure that she was properly treated as a vulnerable witness during cross-examination. In particular, it was argued that counsel for the father did not comply with the techniques set out in the Advocates’ Toolkit, as required by Practice Direction 3AA. The mother submitted that the questioning was persistent and aggressive, that it failed to take proper account of her cognitive vulnerabilities, and that this resulted in her being unable to give her best evidence.
It was further argued that the trial was rendered unfair by the judge’s failure to intervene sufficiently to control the manner and tone of questioning. The mother relied on the fact that she suffered an emotional breakdown during her evidence, requiring the hearing to be adjourned part-way through cross-examination.
Beyond procedural complaints, the mother asserted that the judgment contained numerous factual errors which undermined its reliability. She argued that the judge failed to correct material inaccuracies, or where corrections were made, failed to reconsider their impact on the overall analysis. She further contended that the judge wrongly concluded that she had manipulated evidence, including medical records, and failed to give adequate reasons for findings of collusion between her and her family.
The mother also submitted that the judge failed to conduct a holistic assessment of the evidence and failed to properly consider evidence suggesting that she had attempted to promote contact between the father and the children.
The Father’s Case
The father resisted the appeal in full. He submitted that the trial judge had conducted a fair and careful hearing, had fully complied with FPR Part 3A and Practice Direction 3AA, and had taken extensive steps to support the mother as a vulnerable witness. These steps included regular breaks, an overnight adjournment, reminders to slow the pace of questioning, permission for the mother’s solicitor to sit beside her, and careful monitoring of her ability to continue giving evidence.
The father argued that the Advocates’ Toolkit is guidance rather than prescriptive law and that the ultimate question for the court was whether the proceedings were fair overall. He emphasised that the mother’s own counsel did not seek an adjournment of the trial and expressly accepted during the hearing that any difficulties were remediable.
In relation to the remaining grounds, the father submitted that the appeal amounted to a disagreement with the judge’s findings and assessment of credibility, rather than the identification of any error of law or serious procedural irregularity.
Legal Framework
The High Court applied the appellate test set out in FPR 30.12(3), namely that an appeal may only be allowed where the decision of the lower court was wrong or unjust due to a serious procedural or other irregularity.
In considering the challenge to findings of fact, the court had regard to the principles articulated in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, which emphasise that appellate courts must respect the trial judge’s advantage in seeing and hearing the witnesses and should not interfere lightly with evaluative findings.
In relation to vulnerable witnesses, the court considered FPR Part 3A and Practice Direction 3AA. Paragraph 5.7 of PD3AA provides that advocates are expected to be familiar with and to use the techniques set out in the Advocates’ Toolkit. However, the court emphasised that the Toolkit is guidance rather than a rigid code and that compliance must be assessed by reference to the overall fairness of the proceedings.
The court further reaffirmed the importance of permitting advocates to put their client’s case fully, even where allegations are sensitive or distressing, as this is a fundamental feature of the adversarial process.
Findings
The High Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety. Permission to appeal on Ground 1 was granted but the appeal on that ground was dismissed following full consideration.
In relation to the treatment of the mother as a vulnerable witness, the court concluded that the District Judge had taken all reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure fairness. The judge had identified the mother as vulnerable at an early stage, made detailed participation directions, and actively managed the trial in response to difficulties as they arose. The transcript demonstrated repeated judicial interventions, multiple breaks, and careful consideration of whether the mother was able to continue giving evidence.
The court accepted that the cross-examination was robust and that the subject matter was distressing. However, it concluded that this did not render the proceedings unfair. The mother’s own counsel had not sought an adjournment and had expressly stated that the hearing remained fair and remediable. The judge had ensured that the Advocates’ Toolkit was followed in substance and that the mother’s vulnerabilities were kept under constant review.
The High Court held that Practice Direction 3AA does not require perfection and that the decisive question is whether the witness was able to participate effectively and whether the trial was fair overall. On the facts of this case, those requirements were met.
Permission to appeal on the remaining grounds was refused. The court held that the alleged factual errors were minor and did not undermine the judge’s overall analysis. The trial judge had carefully considered proposed corrections to the draft judgment and had concluded that they made no material difference to her findings. The High Court found no basis to interfere with that assessment.
The challenge relating to alleged manipulation of evidence was rejected. The judgment did not find that the mother manipulated medical records but rather drew adverse inferences from her resistance to metadata analysis and the unreliability of certain evidence. This was a conclusion open to the trial judge.
The court further held that the judge had given adequate reasons for findings of collusion and had conducted a holistic assessment of the evidence. The judgment was detailed, structured, and demonstrated a clear application of the relevant legal principles.
Finally, the finding that the mother had obstructed contact was upheld. The judge had considered evidence from independent professionals and was entitled to weigh that evidence against her broader findings on credibility and parental alienation.
Judgment
The appeal was dismissed in full. McKendrick J concluded that the mother had received a fair hearing and that the findings of fact were neither wrong nor unjust. The judgment provides a clear reaffirmation of the high threshold for appeals against findings of fact, the proper role of the Advocates’ Toolkit, and the need for appellate restraint in private law children proceedings involving complex and emotionally charged disputes.
Full Judgement: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2025/3180.html
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